Before You Start
This is the first of two long pieces. I know. I host a talk radio show; brevity was never going to be my strong suit. I’m asking for a couple of cups of coffee’s worth of your time, twice.
Here’s why I think it’s worth it.
I believe, firmly, that America’s prosperity is tied directly to our position as the world’s only true superpower. Your paycheck, your mortgage rate, the shelves at the grocery store, and the phone in your pocket all rest on it. Most Americans have never been shown that connection. So when the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party flies to Washington and asks our President for one word, most of us don’t see what’s on the table.
I’m going to show you by comparing two islands.
Part One is about Taiwan. After World War II, America put a wall of steel between a poor, frightened island and Chairman Mao Zedong. Taiwan used the peace to build something the entire world now depends on. It’s also about the man in Beijing who wants what Taiwan built.
Part Two is about Britain. Britain won the biggest war in human history, handed the world to America, and then let itself slide into the second tier. I’ll show you what that slide cost ordinary British families: ration books that outlasted the war by 9 years, a currency cut twice, and a foreign lender dictating the national budget. I’ll also show you why, if America slides, we won’t get the soft landing Britain got.
Some of this you’ll agree with. Some of it you’ll want to argue about. I’ve tried to give the other side its strongest case in its own words and then answer it. Every number is sourced at the bottom of each piece, so go check my math.
Then tell me in the comments where you think I’m wrong. Let’s go:
The Island That Did the Homework
On January 5, 1950, President Harry Truman told the world the United States would stay out of it.
Mao Zedong had just won China’s civil war. Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government had fled across roughly a hundred miles of water to an island most Americans still called Formosa. And the President of the United States announced that America would not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces there. A week later, Secretary of State Dean Acheson stood before the National Press Club and traced America’s defense line in the Pacific. Taiwan fell outside it. So did Korea.
Washington had written them both off.
We know how that turned out in Korea. Five and a half months later, on June 25, North Korean tanks rolled south across the 38th parallel. Within days, American troops were headed into a war that has never officially ended. The armistice signed in July 1953 stopped the shooting. Nobody has ever signed a peace treaty. Historians still argue over whether Acheson’s speech told Moscow and Pyongyang the door was open.
Two days after the invasion, President Truman turned to the other place he had written off. Buried in the middle of his statement was a paragraph about the island:
“The occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.”
Then one more sentence. 9 words.
“The 7th Fleet will see that this is done.”
76 years later, that sentence is the reason there is still a Taiwan for Xi Jinping, China’s president and the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, to ask about when he visited the White House.
Korea showed us what happens when an enemy decides America won’t show up. Taiwan is the other half of that lesson. On Taiwan, any crossing would come by sea: ships, missiles and troops across a hundred miles of water.
This is the first of two stories about islands. Both lived under the same American protection after the Second World War. One used the peace to build. The other used it to spend. This one is about the builder, and about the man who wants it.
The Deal
Start with what America did after World War II, because most of us were never taught it as a deal. But it was a deal.
In July 1944, before the war was even won, delegates from 44 nations met at a hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, and built a new financial system with the American dollar at its center. After the surrender, we occupied Japan and rewrote its government. The constitution the Japanese adopted in 1947 still governs them today. In 1948 Congress passed the Marshall Plan, and American taxpayers sent about $13.3 billion to 16 European countries over four years. The Congressional Research Service puts that at roughly $143 billion in 2017 dollars. The first year alone cost $4 billion, when the entire federal budget came to just under $30 billion. Then, in April 1949, came NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Here’s what the United States expected in return: open your markets, trade in dollars, let us put bases on your soil, and stand with us against Moscow. In exchange, the United States Navy keeps the oceans open, the American nuclear umbrella keeps you safe, and you never again have to fight each other the way you did twice in 30 years.
It paid. Boy, did it pay.
By 1945 the United States was manufacturing more than half of all the goods produced on Earth and held roughly two-thirds of the world’s gold reserves, according to the National WWII Museum. Back home, the Greatest Generation came off the troop ships, went to college on the GI Bill, bought houses on streets that hadn’t existed five years earlier, and went to work. Real median family income, adjusted for inflation, roughly doubled between 1947 and 1973. Census figures put it at about $21,200 in 1947 and $43,200 in 1973, both in 2003 dollars.
Two cautions, up front.
First, Washington did all of this out of self-interest, and it happened to work. Korea and Vietnam were part of the bill, and we paid those bills in American lives.
Second, the boom had homegrown causes too. We had the only major industrial base on the planet that no bomb had touched. We had the GI Bill and the baby boom. The world order was one engine among several. Its job was to make sure the rest of the world was open for business when we showed up to sell.
Now notice the year NATO was born. 1949.
That’s the same year Mao won, and Chiang’s government fled to an island called Formosa at the time, now known as Taiwan.
The Student Who Did the Homework
In 1952, by one widely cited estimate, Taiwan’s income per person was about $170 a year. That put it in the company of some of the poorest countries in Africa. The island was crowded with soldiers and refugees from the mainland, ruled under martial law, and sitting within artillery range of an enemy that had just won a war.
It had exactly one thing going for it. The US 7th Fleet was in the Strait between the island and the Chinese mainland.
Next came the aid. Between 1951 and 1965, the United States sent Taiwan roughly $1.5 billion in economic assistance. By USAID’s figures, that money paid for about 38% of the island’s total investment and about 40% of its imports. American tax dollars paid for most of Taiwan’s early infrastructure, starting with its power company. Just as we did in rural America, we helped electrify the island.
Plenty of countries got American money and wasted it. Taiwan did something productive with it. The government broke up the big landlord estates and turned tenant farmers into landowners, then used the farm surplus to push people into factories. Between 1952 and 1982, the economy grew an average of 8.7% a year. For 30 years!
Then came the breakfast.
In February 1974, seven men sat down at a modest soymilk shop in Taiwan. One was Sun Yun-suan, the minister of economic affairs. Another was Pan Wen-yuan, a Taiwanese-born engineer who was running a laboratory for RCA in the United States. According to the Taipei Times, which reconstructed the morning last year, Pan made his pitch over breakfast. Taiwan’s cheap-labor factories were going to lose to Southeast Asia. The island needed to move up. It needed integrated circuits.
The breakfast cost less than NT$400. The plan they agreed on cost NT$400 million.
Two years later, in 1976, Taiwan’s government research institute signed a technology-transfer deal with RCA. Pan had talked RCA into selling its outdated seven-micron chip technology on favorable terms. That same year, 19 young Taiwanese engineers flew to the United States to learn it. On October 29, 1977, Taiwan’s first chip demonstration factory opened in Zhudong, in Hsinchu County. It made three-inch silicon wafers.
Three inches. Technology that in 1976 an American company was happy to sell off.
In the mid-1980s, Taiwan’s government recruited a man named Morris Chang to come run that research institute. The man credited with bringing him home was Sun Yun-suan, the same official from the soymilk shop, who had risen to become Premier. Chang had spent 25 years at Texas Instruments in Dallas and risen to run its worldwide semiconductor business. In 1987 he founded the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. TSMC made one bet nobody else would make. It would design nothing. Instead, it would build chips for everybody else.
I believe in free markets, so I have to be truthful about how TSMC started. It began as a government venture. At its founding, Taiwan’s government held about 48% of the company, and the Dutch electronics giant Philips held about 28% in exchange for its technology. This was industrial policy. The true version of the story is that Taiwan’s government picked a lane, then let a ferociously competitive company run in it, and the global market supplied the discipline. Every chip TSMC sells has to beat Samsung and Intel on price and performance, every single year.
For most of this miracle Taiwan was, indeed, a dictatorship. Martial law lasted 38 years and didn’t lift until July 15, 1987. The first direct presidential election came in 1996. The prosperity came first. Freedom followed the prosperity. That’s part of what the American umbrella bought.
On the campaign trail in 2024, Donald Trump, according to Reuters, said Taiwan stole America’s semiconductor business. I understand the frustration. But go back to that breakfast. Taiwan bought what RCA was getting rid of, sent 19 kids to learn it, and outworked everyone for 50 years. Meanwhile a lot of American chip companies decided it was cheaper to design chips and hire somebody else to build them. Taiwan became the somebody else.
Today, one company on that island, TSMC, makes more than 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. That number depends on how you define “advanced,” and some analysts put it closer to 60% on a broader definition. Either way, the phone in your pocket and the artificial intelligence boom half of Wall Street is betting on both run through a few dozen square miles around Hsinchu.
One number gets thrown around a lot, so let’s analyze it honestly. Adjusted for cost of living, the IMF puts Taiwan’s income per person for 2026 at about $98,000. That’s ahead of Britain at about $68,000 and even ahead of the United States at about $94,000. Measured in straight dollars, Taiwan comes in closer to $42,000, and some economists argue its currency is kept artificially cheap, which inflates the adjusted figure. So don’t go around saying the average Taiwanese is richer than the average American. Say this instead: in about 70 years, Taiwan went from $170 a year to the front rank of the world’s economies.
America built the protective wall. Taiwan did the homework behind that wall.
The Man Who Wants It
Beijing has never hidden what it wants.
In March 2005, China’s legislature passed what it calls the Anti-Secession Law. Article 8 authorizes “non-peaceful means” if Taiwan moves toward formal separation, or if Beijing decides peaceful reunification has become impossible. Either way, Beijing gets to decide what counts.
Now watch what Beijing has been practicing.
On December 29 and 30 last year, less than two weeks after Washington announced more than $10 billion in new arms sales to Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army ran an exercise it called “Justice Mission 2025.” According to Defense News, it covered the largest geographic range of any drill since 2022. Chinese forces rehearsed blocking Taiwan’s major air and sea routes across five zones around the island. On December 30 alone, Taiwan tracked 60 Chinese fighter sorties, and 44 of them crossed the median line of the Strait. Hundreds of civilian flights were disrupted.
That’s what a dress rehearsal looks like.
This August, with a typhoon bearing down, China’s Guangdong Maritime Safety Administration announced traffic controls on ships moving through the Taiwan Strait and said all vessels must “follow the instructions of maritime authorities.” The US State Department answered that it “opposes any actions that interfere with high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight that apply in the Taiwan Strait.” A typhoon makes a convenient excuse. That’s one of the busiest shipping lanes on the planet. Beijing is testing whether the world will start asking its permission to use it.
Then came last week.
Last Thursday, Xi Jinping stood in the White House. According to Xinhua, China’s official news agency, he told President Trump the United States should “adhere to the correct position of opposing Taiwan independence.” For nearly half a century the American position has been that we “do not support” Taiwan independence. Diplomats pair that with what they call strategic ambiguity: Washington never says for certain whether it would fight to defend the island. Beijing wants us to move from staying out of it to taking China’s side. Everything we know about that exchange comes from Chinese state media. The White House fact sheet on the talks, released the next day, didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to Taiwan’s Central News Agency. China’s own Foreign Ministry readout did.
Here’s a detail most of the coverage skipped. In February 2025, this same administration’s State Department quietly removed even the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” from its official fact sheet on Taiwan. Beijing howled. The State Department called it a routine update. So Xi is asking us to move the line past where it started, in the other direction.
He has reason to think he might get somewhere. In May, after his trip to Beijing, the President said he was holding a pending arms package for Taiwan “in abeyance” and called the sales a “very good negotiating chip,” according to the Associated Press. What did we get last week? The two sides extended their trade truce. By two months.
Here’s the part about the chips that surprised me when I dug into it.
A lot of people assume Beijing wants Taiwan so it can grab TSMC. It can’t. In 2022, TSMC’s chairman at the time, Mark Liu, told CNN that an invasion would leave the company “non-operable.” His explanation was simple. The factories depend on a real-time connection to suppliers all over the world for chemicals, spare parts, and software. Cut the island off and the lines stop. Bloomberg reported in 2024, citing people familiar with the matter, that the Dutch firm ASML, which makes the machines TSMC uses to print its most advanced chips, assured its own government it could shut those machines down remotely if China invaded. Neither company has confirmed how that would work. Many refer to that ability as a “kill switch.”
The chips are a hostage. A war or a blockade takes TSMC offline for everyone, China included. Bloomberg Economics modeled what a war over Taiwan would cost the world: about $10 trillion, roughly 10% of global economic output. In that model, the American economy shrinks by 6.7%. That’s the plant down the road laying off a shift. That’s your 401(k).
Why can’t we just build the chips here? We’re trying, and we’re helping pay for it. TSMC has committed $165 billion to Arizona, backed by $6.6 billion in federal CHIPS Act grants and up to $5 billion in loans. As of today, one Arizona plant is producing, making four-nanometer chips since early 2025. The next one, at three nanometers, is scheduled for volume production in the second half of 2027. The two-nanometer plant is targeted for around 2029. When all six planned Arizona plants are finished, they’re expected to hold about 30% of TSMC’s most advanced capacity worldwide. But the cutting edge stays in Taiwan.
Demand is running away from supply. At TSMC’s shareholder meeting in June, CEO C.C. Wei said, “The growth is insane this year, in particular,” and admitted that “customer demand has outstripped what we can supply,” according to the Taipei Times.
Arizona is real. It is also years from being enough, and a blockade would arrive on Beijing’s schedule, not ours.
Our allies understand what’s at stake better than we do. Last November, Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, told her parliament that an attack on Taiwan involving “battleships and the use of force” could be a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. Those words matter in Japanese law. They’re the trigger that would let Japan fight alongside an ally. Beijing answered by warning Chinese tourists to stay out of Japan, getting its airlines to offer refunds on Japan trips, and warning Chinese students about studying there. Japan’s own leader put Taiwan inside Japan’s survival, and China punished Japan for saying it out loud.
Last Thursday, Xi also brought up what scholars call the Thucydides Trap, the old idea that a rising power and an established power tend to end up at war. According to Foreign Policy, Xi said it should be “a race of catching up with one another.”
Catching up. Xi’s telling you what he thinks this is, and which of us is doing the chasing.
What It Buys You, and Why We Can’t See It
What does all this have to do with the price of eggs in Highlands Ranch?
Start with your money. According to the International Monetary Fund, in the first quarter of this year, 57% of all the foreign currency reserves held by the world’s central banks were in US dollars. The euro came in at 20%. China’s currency? Just under 2%. When the world gets nervous, it buys American. It parks its savings in our Treasury bonds. Most economists believe that steady demand lets Americans borrow more cheaply than we otherwise could. It shows up in your mortgage rate and your car loan.
Then there are the sea lanes. Nearly everything on the shelves at your Walmart got here across water the US Navy keeps open. This year you found out what happens when one sea lane closes. The war with Iran choked off shipping in the Persian Gulf, and you paid for it every time you filled up.
That’s the deal. It’s still running. Most Americans have no idea it exists.
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs has polled Americans about the world for 50 years. In its 2024 survey, 9 out of 10 people overestimated how much of the federal budget goes to foreign aid, by at least double. 6 in 10 guessed it was 10% or more. The real figure is about 1%. Only 1%. In the Council’s 2025 survey, for the first time, a majority of Republicans said the United States should stay out of world affairs.
Republicans. The party of Reagan. Maybe a lot of the people reading this.
On Taiwan specifically, the Council found last year that 63% of Americans would send weapons if China invaded. Only 43% would send American troops, and 51% would not.
I’ll admit my first instinct was to blame that on a generation that doesn’t remember what our parents and grandparents gave up. Then I looked up what they actually thought.
In September 1939, right after Hitler invaded Poland, Gallup asked Americans whether we should send our Army and Navy to fight Germany. 84% said no. 90% opposed declaring war. But 58% were willing to sell war materials to Britain and France.
Sell the weapons. Keep the boys home.
The numbers aren’t identical. Americans today are far more willing to send troops than Americans were in 1939. The instinct is the same, though: arm them first, and hope it never comes to our kids.
What changed the Greatest Generation’s mind was December 7, 1941. Pearl Harbor. A Gallup poll taken the following week found 97% of Americans approved of declaring war on Japan. Their resolve came after the attack.
The whole point of deterrence is to make sure we never need another one.
The Other Side
The serious case against me comes from a group called the Quincy Institute, and specifically from a scholar there named Michael Swaine. In September 2025, he argued that Taiwan is an important American interest but not a vital one.
Here is his case, in his terms. A war between the US and China would be “supremely destructive” no matter who won. Chinese control of Taiwan would give Beijing some military advantages but not control of Asia. Rebuilding advanced chipmaking in America and allied countries would cost far less than fighting a war. Japan and South Korea judge American reliability by shared interests, not by Taiwan. So the United States should keep arming Taiwan but rule out defending it with American forces.
It’s a thoughtful argument, and parts of it are true. A war would be catastrophic. Building fabs is cheaper than fighting.
But it compares the wrong 2 things. The choice in front of us is between deterrence and war, and deterrence is how you avoid the war. Publicly ruling out an American defense tells Beijing the price of an invasion just dropped. The chip rebuild runs on our timetable, and Arizona won’t hit three nanometers until the second half of 2027 at the earliest. A blockade runs on Beijing’s timetable. And Japan’s prime minister has already told her parliament, on the record, that her country’s survival is tied to Taiwan’s.
Swaine is right about one thing, and I won’t ignore it. The public in our allied countries is divided. A Kyodo News poll found Japanese voters split 48.8% in favor of defending Taiwan militarily and 44.2% against. Ours is split, too.
That tells you where the work is. We have to explain this, to them and to ourselves.
The Wall
Go back to Truman’s 9 words. “The 7th Fleet will see that this is done.”
Behind that wall, a crowded island of refugees ruled by a dictator turned itself into the place where the modern world’s brains get made, and then into a democracy that holds real elections. It did the homework. The United States made the homework possible, and got an enormous return on it every time you bought a phone, a computer, or anything else that runs on an advanced chip. Look around the room you’re sitting in.
Beijing wants that island, and it wants a Washington that shrugs when it moves. Last week Xi asked for one word to help him get there. The answer should be no.
There’s another island in this story. It won the biggest war in human history, handed the world to America, and then spent the prize. That’s Part Two.
Tell me in the comments: would you send the Navy to break a Chinese blockade of Taiwan? And explain why.
Sourcing and Verification
The 7th Fleet. Truman’s statement of June 27, 1950, is from the Truman Library’s Public Papers of the Presidents. His January 5, 1950, statement on Formosa (”the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa”) is from the Truman Library and USC’s US-China Institute archive. Acheson’s January 12, 1950, National Press Club speech is standard historical record. The Korean War armistice was signed July 27, 1953; no peace treaty has followed.
The postwar deal. Marshall Plan totals, recipients, and the first-year budget comparison: Congressional Research Service, “The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance” (R45079). US share of world manufacturing and gold: the National WWII Museum. Median family income, 1947 and 1973: US Census Bureau figures, as compiled in constant 2003 dollars by the Economic Policy Institute.
Taiwan’s rise. The 1952 income estimate and 1952-82 growth rate are widely cited in histories of the “Taiwan Miracle”; treat the $170 figure as an estimate. US aid totals and shares come from USAID figures reported by Ketagalan Media. The 1974 soymilk-shop breakfast, the RCA deal, the 19 engineers, and the 1977 demonstration plant: Taipei Times, “Taiwan in Time” (October 26, 2025), and the Industrial Technology Research Institute’s own history. Morris Chang’s career and TSMC’s founding ownership: public company histories. Martial law and the 1996 election: Lowy Institute.
Chips and Arizona. TSMC’s share of advanced chips: Global Taiwan Institute and The Conversation (definitions vary). Mark Liu’s “non-operable” remarks: CNN interview, reported by Taiwan’s Central News Agency, August 2022. The ASML remote-disable report: Bloomberg, May 21, 2024, anonymous sources, unconfirmed by the companies. TSMC Arizona status, investment, and CHIPS Act support: TSMC, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and public reporting. C.C. Wei’s June 2026 remarks: Taipei Times, June 5, 2026.
Beijing. Anti-Secession Law, Article 8 (March 14, 2005). “Justice Mission 2025”: Defense News, January 8, 2026. August 2026 Taiwan Strait traffic controls and the State Department response: Taipei Times, August 11, 2026, and American Enterprise Institute China-Taiwan Update, August 14, 2026. Xi’s “oppose” request: Xinhua, as reported by Bloomberg, Reuters, and CNN. White House fact sheet omitting Taiwan: Taiwan’s Central News Agency (Focus Taiwan), September 26, 2026. The February 2025 State Department fact-sheet change: Taiwan’s Central News Agency, Taipei Times, CNN, and Fox News. Trump’s “negotiating chip” remarks: Associated Press, May 16, 2026. December arms package: Associated Press, December 18, 2025. Trade truce extension: Reuters. Xi on the Thucydides Trap: Reuters and Foreign Policy.
Allies. Prime Minister Takaichi’s November 7, 2025, remarks, China’s response, and the Kyodo poll: TIME.
The money and the public. Reserve currency shares: IMF COFER data brief, June 30, 2026. War cost model: Bloomberg Economics, January 2024 (a model estimate). Foreign-aid misperception and “stay out” polling: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2024 and 2025 surveys. Taiwan-specific polling: Chicago Council, July-August 2025. 1939 and 1941 polling: Gallup Vault.
The other side. Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan: An Important but Non-Vital US Interest,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, September 25, 2025.
Corrections and tips: michaelbrown@iheartmedia.com



Yes! And thanks for giving us the background that gets lost through the years. I just wish more Republicans would speak out in support of Taiwan (and also Ukraine.)
Absolutely must protect Taiwan. Our ability to build (and staff) fabs, at the scale necessary to maintain commerce, does not exist. Look at the opposition to data enter buildout we have today. Fabs will encounter the same headwinds.