Today on-air I spoke about the “general welfare” phrase, as used in the US Constitution, and asked a question I have been asking my audiences for years: can we really live as citizens in a free society as James Madison envisioned when he wrote that Constitution? Perhaps the answer is in a simple question, that everyone always runs to whenever a problem needs addressing; or, a political argument turns to the role of government. I’ll ask you the question again, at the end of the essay.
The sentence everyone quotes — and the one they mean
Somebody wants something large and permanent, and they use four words to justify the government taking on that something: “provide for the general welfare.” The first thing to understand is that the phrase appears in the Constitution twice, and the two times it appears could not be more different in what they actually do.
The Preamble says: “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution…” This is a statement of purpose. Consider it to be our “mission statement” just like you might put one of those motivational posters in your office.
It is settled beyond any real dispute the Preamble grants no power to anyone. The Supreme Court said so plainly in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905): the Preamble “has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the Government of the United States.” You justify that program you want on the Preamble. So when “general welfare” is quoted at a ribbon-cutting, it is almost always quoted from the one place in the Constitution where it is legally inapplicable.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 is the operative part. That’s where the Constitution says “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States…” This is inside the grant of legislative power. This is the clause the whole fight has always been about and historically this fight is as old as our Republic itself.
Two men who were in the room disagreed about what Clause 1 meant. The disagreement is not a modern argument. The argument is foundational, and both put their reasoning in writing.
Madison: the enumeration would be an absurdity otherwise
In Federalist No. 41, Madison took the broad reading head-on. He wrote that the objection — that the taxing clause “amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare” — was a “misconstruction,” and that “no stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.”
Madison’s structural argument is the heart of it, and it is the argument I agree with. Madison asked why, if the general-welfare language already granted a general power, the Framers would then bother to enumerate specific powers at all:
“For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning… is an absurdity…”
That is the point in one paragraph: do not hand someone every power and then carefully list a handful of powers. The so-called “enumerated powers” only make sense if the general words summarize the list rather than transcend it. Madison’s reading treats the Constitution as a document of limited and enumerated powers — which is what its own structure, and later the Tenth Amendment, plainly say it is.
Hamilton: a substantive power of its own
Hamilton took the opposite view. He most influentially articulated his argument in his 1791 Report on the Subject of Manufactures. He argued that the general-welfare clause conferred a distinct power to tax and spend, not confined to the other enumerated powers, limited only by the requirement that the spending serve the general (national, not local) welfare. On this reading, Congress may spend for ends it could not directly regulate.
The bridge between Hamilton and the modern U. S. Supreme Court is Justice Joseph Story, whose Commentaries on the Constitution (1833) endorsed the Hamiltonian reading. When the Court finally chose sides, it leaned on Story explicitly, which matters, because Story is arguably a step slightly more restrained than Hamilton, a nuance worth remembering later.
In 1936–1937 the U. S. Supreme Court picks Hamilton’s view, on the record, and Madison loses. That means I lose, legally, but not philosophically.
For a century and a half the Supreme Court had noted the dispute but never resolved it. Then, in two New Deal cases, it did. And the honest, useful fact is that the Court did not pretend the answer was obvious. The Court openly acknowledged it was choosing between two weighty views.
United States v. Butler (1936) — adopts the Hamiltonian reading
In United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), Justice Roberts laid the two positions side by side. He summarized Madison’s view that the clause “amounted to no more than a reference to the other powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same section,” and Hamilton’s view that it “confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated… limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare.” Then the Court admits: “Each contention has had the support of those whose views are entitled to weight. This court has noticed the question, but has never found it necessary to decide which is the true construction.” That follows Supreme Court tradition of not decision a Constitutional issue until you absolutely, finally, must address that issue because it is squarely in front of in a case.
The Court then chose: “Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouses the Hamiltonian position… the reading advocated by Mr. Justice Story is the correct one.” The spending power, it held, is not confined to the other enumerated powers. Think about that. The federal spending power is not confined to the powers granted Congress. The floodgates are opening.
The wrinkle worth knowing because my legal friends and Constitutional experts will argue is that Butler adopted the broad reading of the spending clause but then struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act anyway, on the ground that it invaded powers reserved to the states. So Butler is simultaneously the case that opened the door to broad federal spending and a case that voided a federal program. Both are true. The doctrine that survived is the broad reading of the clause: the general welfare gave Congress the power to spend. And spend. And spend.
Helvering v. Davis (1937) — upholds Social Security, and won’t “resurrect the contest”
That choice of Hamilton over Madison became foundational a year later in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), which upheld the old-age benefit provisions of the Social Security Act against a Tenth Amendment challenge. Justice Cardozo, for a 7–2 Court, was candid that the Court was ratifying a contested choice, not reading an obvious command:
“There have been statesmen in our history who have stood for other views… We will not resurrect the contest. It is now settled by decision. The conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton… has prevailed over that of Madison…”
Cardozo grounded the result in the national scale of the problem: “Spreading from state to state, unemployment is an ill not particular but general, which may be checked, if Congress so determines, by the resources of the nation.” The line between “general” and “particular” welfare, he said, belongs to Congress “unless the choice is clearly wrong.” That deference is the doctrine we still live under. I believe the Court was wrong, that I am right, but I did not get to write the opinion.
Why I think Butler got it wrong — my belief and conviction, not the law
Let me be scrupulous about the categories here. What the courts have held is not in dispute: Hamilton’s reading won, and that is now the law. My belief is the Court reached the wrong result. This is my argument about what the Constitution should mean, not a claim about what courts will currently, or ever, enforce. Yes, I am probably tilting at windmills.
My strongest ground is the one Madison himself maintained: the structure of the document. A constitution that grants a general power and then enumerates particular ones has written its own enumeration into irrelevance. The canon Madison invoked is that the expression of particulars implies the exclusion of a general grants. That is not a partisan gloss; it is ordinary legal reasoning that is taught in law school. My own Constitutional professors taught me that. Read the Tenth Amendment on top of it (“The powers not delegated… are reserved”) and the enumerated-powers reading is the one that makes the whole architecture of the Constitution cohesive.
The second ground is about authorship and timing. The man who lost in Butler is the man who framed the Constitution and kept the convention’s notes. When the architect of a structure tells you which walls are load bearing, and a court 150 years later overrules him in the middle of a national emergency with a Justice (Roberts) whose sudden shift in that Court’s term is remembered as “the switch in time that saved nine” then it is at least fair to ask whether the law followed the Constitution or followed the crisis. I believe they followed the crisis and ignored Madison.
The counter-argument, in its strongest form
Fairness demands the other side’s best case, so here it is. First: the Constitution had to govern a real and growing nation, and a spending power frozen to 1787’s enumerated list would have left the country unable to meet national problems — depressions, old age, interstate collapse — that no single state could solve. Second: the text of Clause 1 does list “general Welfare” as an object of the taxing-and-spending power, and Story — no radical — read it as substantive. Third: ninety years of reliance have built an entire social compact on this reading; unwinding it now would be its own kind of injustice. These are serious arguments. I do not think they overcome the structural problem, but a listener should weigh them honestly rather than take my word for it.
Liberty is a component of the common good — not its opposite
One clarification keeps this from curdling into my typical anti-government reflex. The columnist Josh Hammer, writing in the New York Sun, makes a point worth crediting: many critics treat “the common good” as if it were the enemy of individual liberty. I think that is a false choice. The Founders cherished liberty and counted it among the most important components of the common good. They also saw other components too, such as order and virtue.
That is exactly right, and it cuts both ways. It means the progressive who invokes “the common good” to justify an ever-larger state has misidentified the good. Because a common good that erodes the self-reliance and liberty of the citizen has eaten one of its own essential parts. And it means the libertarian who hears “common good” and reaches for his holster has misread the Founders. They never thought liberty was the whole of it. The common good is liberty and order and virtue, all of those traits, held in tension. Lose any one and we lose the whole thing.
The common good the Founders actually feared losing
Strip away the spending fight and we get to the thing the Founders cared about most. That thing they cared most about was not what government provides, but what a self-governing people must be.
In Federalist No. 55, Madison wrote: “As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.” Self-government, a republican, small “r” government, is the form that requires virtue in the people because there is no king to supply order from above.
In Federalist No. 57, Madison named the aim of the whole Constitution: “The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society.” Federalist No. 57 is about the virtue of rulers; No. 55 is about the virtue of citizens. Do not merge those two. The citizen-character argument rests on 55, and you should know and recognize that.
So the common good, in the founding sense, is a demand before it is a benefit. It is the juror who takes the oath seriously, the neighbor who shows up, the voter who does the serious reading of a ballot measure, the citizen who can argue at the top of his lungs on Tuesday then stand in the front yard with his neighbor on Wednesday when the neighbor was arguing at the top of his lungs against you. The founding fear was never that we would fail to fund the common good. It was that we would forget how to be that common good. The Founders feared we would trade the hard work of governing ourselves for the comfort of being governed.
Which brings me to the question I asked a few times every year on-air.
What it means for self-governance in the 21st century
Now the difficult part. The history and legal lesson above was easy.
If the common good is what a free people must be, then the modern danger is not merely an out-of-control federal, state or even local budget. I believe the modern danger is the slow habit of outsourcing the work of citizenship: our thinking abdicated to the nearest screen, our judgment abdicated to the nearest tribe, and, increasingly, our abdication of independence to a government that offers to carry every burden in exchange for our ceasing to act like people who could carry them ourselves.
That is the real objection to building the whole social order on the Hamiltonian spending power. Not that the checks don’t clear eventually, but that a citizenry which is provided for in everything gradually forgets how to provide, decide, and govern for itself. Madison’s worry and the 21st-century worry are the same worry. A republic runs on the character of its citizens. Or it does not run at all. The general welfare, rightly understood, is less a coupon than a mirror.
And the question it asks is the one that has always mattered to me: are we still the kind of people who can do this ourselves?
I would love to hear your answer to that question. And, why you answer it the way you do.



Madison understood that self governing citizens need to have skin in the game. The overreach in the Hamilton approach has created a critical mass of voters that no longer have a stake in the taxation but can control the representation.
I think we're still the people who can. Unfortunately, we increasingly choose not to.