Part II. In Part I, we watched Europe cross a line America hasn’t reached — the toughest deportation regime in the bloc’s history, passed as an emerging consensus. The obvious question is why. Americans rendered a thunderous verdict on the open border too. Then they got queasy about what enforcing it actually looks like. The distance between those two reactions — and the way our media polices it — is the exact reason we’re a few exits behind Brussels.
If you read Part I, you’ll remember where it ended: Europe got there because the public and the political class finally fused. America’s problem is that ours never did. To see why, start with a man who told a lie so cleanly, so repeatedly, and so officially that it eventually became an article of impeachment.
For most of President Biden’s term, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas sat in front of Congress and the cameras and told the American people that the southern border was “secure.” Not improving. Not challenging. Secure. He testified that the Department of Homeland Security had “operational control” of the border — a phrase that has a specific legal definition under the Secure Fence Act of 2006, a definition that requires the prevention of all unlawful entries. As an attorney, I want you to sit with that. “Operational control” is not a vibe. It’s a statutory term with a meaning, and the meaning is the opposite of what was happening.
What was actually happening: somewhere north of eight million illegal crossings over the course of the administration. Mass parole programs that functioned, in practice, as a side door around the legal immigration system. A “Remain in Mexico” policy dismantled. A border-wall contract terminated. And a Secretary going before the people’s representatives to assure them it was all under control.
The House of Representatives impeached him for it in February 2024 — the first Cabinet secretary impeached in nearly 150 years. The second article of impeachment was, in essence, you lied to us. The Senate, controlled by his own party, dismissed the charges without a trial in April 2024. You can argue, as Mayorkas’s defenders did, that a policy disagreement isn’t a high crime. Fine. But here’s what no Senate vote could dismiss: the American people had been watching the same border the whole time, and they did not believe him. They could see it. And in November 2024, they delivered their own verdict — one that no procedural motion could table.
The Verdict They Actually Rendered
This is where I need you to follow along carefully, because the conventional conservative telling of this story is true but incomplete, and the incomplete version is exactly what’s going to get us beaten in the next round.
The conventional telling: Americans watched the open border, watched Mayorkas lie about it, and elected Donald Trump to shut it down. All true. In June 2024, a CBS News/YouGov poll found 62% of Americans favored deporting all undocumented immigrants. That is a landslide-level number on a question that, a decade earlier, would have been treated as fringe. The border verdict was real, it was decisive, and it was bipartisan at the margins in a way that terrified the Democratic Party.
But watch what happened next — because this is the whole ballgame.
The border verdict and the enforcement verdict are two different things, and the American public split them apart almost immediately. Look at the polling once ICE actually went to work:
• General support for deporting people here illegally held steady — Marquette found 56% still favoring it in early 2026; other polls put the floor at 56-61%. The principle survived.
• But approval of ICE’s actual conduct collapsed. A February 2026 Marquette Law School poll found 60% of Americans disapprove of the way ICE is handling its job. A Reuters/Ipsos poll the same month found roughly 60% saying ICE has “gone too far.”
• And here’s the number that should stop every conservative cold: a YouGov poll found 46% of Americans support abolishing ICE outright, against 41% opposed. More Americans wanted to abolish the enforcement agency than wanted to keep it. Among independents — the people who decide elections — 47% backed abolition.
So the same electorate that voted 62% for deportation in 2024 was, eighteen months later, narrowly in favor of abolishing the agency that does the deporting. That is not hypocrisy. That is a public that wanted the result of enforcement without the sight of it. As one immigration analyst put it bluntly: most Americans favor immigration enforcement — they just don’t want to see or hear much about it.
That sentence is the most important thing in this essay, so let me say it in my own words and put my name on it: Americans wanted the border closed. They did not sign up to watch federal agents drag their neighbors out of restaurant kitchens on the evening news. The verdict was for the policy. The flinch was at the picture.
What Turned the Flinch Into a Rout
A flinch is natural. A flinch can be managed. What turned this flinch into a genuine collapse in support for ICE — the thing that has functionally capped how far America can go — was a specific sequence of events and a specific machine for amplifying them.
The events: in January 2026, federal agents fatally shot two U.S. citizens — Renee Good and Alex Pretti — in the Minneapolis area within roughly a month of each other. Not illegal aliens. American citizens. Whatever the facts of each case turn out to be — and they’re disputed; a Marquette poll found Americans split 37-62 on whether the Good shooting was justified — the political effect was instant and enormous. Every poll showing the ICE collapse was taken in the shadow of those shootings. The enforcement abstraction had become a body, and a name, and a citizen’s name at that.
That is the raw material. Now here is the machine that shapes it.
The Framing, and How It Holds the Line
Here’s where the dominant media does its most consequential work — not by lying, exactly, but by choosing the frame.
Recall the European vote from Part I. When the Parliament passed its deportation regime, the international and American press reflexively reached for one comparison, over and over: “ICE-style.” “US-style.” The European left branded their own continent’s law as the Americanization of cruelty. Stop and appreciate the strangeness of that. The same media ecosystem that treats American immigration enforcement as a national disgrace has now exported “ICE” as the global shorthand for repression. ICE has been transformed from a federal agency into an adjective — and the adjective means the bad thing.
That framing does specific, identifiable work, and it runs on a predictable cycle:
First, it isolates the image from the principle. Coverage of enforcement overwhelmingly centers the raid, the cuffs, the crying family, the citizen caught in the dragnet — the 11% of Americans who, polls show, support family separation, never the 56% who support deportation as a concept. The principle is popular; the picture is not; so the coverage is wall-to-wall picture. The result is a public that supports the policy in the abstract and recoils from it in every concrete instance it’s shown.
Second, it elevates the hardest cases to stand for the whole. The U.S.-citizen shootings, the wrongful detention, the sympathetic dreamer — these become the representative image of enforcement, while the deported criminal alien with a violent record, who polls at 73% support for removal, vanishes from the frame. You are shown the exceptions until the exceptions feel like the rule.
Third — and this is the European connection — it pre-loads the word “deportation” with “far-right.”Notice that in the EU coverage, the law is “far-right-backed” even though it passed with the votes of the mainstream center-right and a chunk of liberals, and even though majorities of European voters support it. When a policy commands majority support but is labeled “far-right” by the press, the label isn’t describing the policy’s position on the spectrum. It’s describing the press’s position on the policy. And it’s doing something sneaky: it’s telling the persuadable middle that to want this thing is to be that kind of person.
That is the mechanism. That is how the framing holds the line. It doesn’t have to convince a majority that deportation is wrong — it never could; the majority supports it. It only has to make the enforcement of deportation feel shameful, extreme, and un-American enough that no political coalition can sustain the public, visible, large-scale interior enforcement that Europe just authorized. It caps the ceiling. It keeps the flinch fresh.
Why This Keeps Us a Few Exits Back
Here is the through-line to where we started, and where tomorrow’s larger argument picks up.
Europe just went “full deportation” — offshore return hubs, 24-month detention, the works — and it did so as an emerging cross-partisan consensus. The center-right adopted the enforcement position outright. The liberals split. The socialists couldn’t hold their own members. The result, ugly chants and all, was a law that now sits in the realm of the normal and the durable.
America cannot currently do that, and the reason isn’t that Americans disagree on the border. They don’t — they rendered a crushing verdict on the border, and that verdict still holds in the polling today. The reason is that America’s enforcement verdict was split off from its border verdict and then worked over, relentlessly, by a media frame that makes the act of enforcement feel like the thing decent people oppose. In Europe, “send them back” became a parliamentary majority. In America, “abolish ICE” became a 46% plurality — in a country that voted 62% to deport.
That gap — between what Americans decided about the border and what they’ll stomach watching us do about it — is the exact distance between Brussels and Washington on this issue. Europe closed that gap because the cultural shock was severe enough, and the political realignment honest enough, to fuse principle and enforcement back together. America hasn’t, because our enforcement was severed from our principle and then framed into something we’re supposed to be ashamed of.
We are not a different country than Europe on immigration. We are the same country, a few exits back on the same highway, still arguing in the car about whether we’re even allowed to want what we already voted for.
Part I laid out what Europe just did and why the cordon sanitaire finally fell. This is the American mirror: we reached the same verdict on the border, but ours was severed from its enforcement and worked over until acting on it felt shameful. Europe fused principle and enforcement. We pulled them apart. Whether we ever put them back together — and what it would cost if we did — is the question the next few years will answer for us, the same way this past week answered it for them.



I spent the last 19 of my 31 year federal career with ICE. We get a black eye because we have so much damage to undo and nowhere near the resources. Like most law enforcement, a truly thankless job.
Mayorkas should be hanging by his you-know-what in a jail cell for the rest of his pathetic life.