It started with a single clause buried inside a Wall Street Journal article about commercial real estate. Nearly 40% of office space in Denver’s central business district is vacant, the paper reported — the highest rate among the country’s top 50 cities, according to real-estate services firm CBRE Group.
That’s the kind of statistic that lands and then slides off, because the scale is too abstract to feel. Forty percent. Highest in the country. Sure. Next story.
But pull on that thread, and the whole sweater unravels. What you find underneath is not a real estate story. It is an economic story, a political story, a social story, and ultimately a story about what happens when one political party holds total, uncontested power over a great American city and state for long enough that there is no one left to blame but themselves — and the consequences are now too large and too documented to deny.
This is that story.
THE NUMBER IS REAL — AND IT’S WORSE THAN REPORTED
Start with the evidence, because that’s where every honest argument has to start.
The CBRE Q1 2026 report puts downtown Denver’s total office vacancy at 38.9% — a new all-time high. The Wall Street Journal’s “nearly 40%” was, if anything, rounding conservatively. In upper downtown — the traditional Central Business District, the geographic and symbolic heart of the city — vacancy exceeds 40%, reaching as high as 46.4% in some blocks. Some individual buildings are 100% empty.
To understand what those numbers mean in physical terms: downtown Denver has roughly 31.4 million square feet of office space. Approximately 12 million square feet of it sits vacant right now. That is enough empty space to house 50,000 to 60,000 office workers who are no longer commuting downtown daily. Eight Empower Field stadiums, stacked with silence.
During the entire Great Recession — the worst financial crisis in a generation — downtown Denver’s vacancy peaked at only 17.4%.
The trajectory is even more alarming than the snapshot. Total downtown office vacancy was 16.5% at the end of 2019 — a few months before COVID arrived. It crossed 20% in early 2021, 25% a year later, 30% in the third quarter of 2023. It has now nearly reached 39% and is still setting records. For context: during the entire Great Recession — the worst financial crisis in a generation — downtown Denver’s vacancy peaked at only 17.4%. The pandemic and its aftermath have done more damage to this city’s commercial core than the financial collapse of 2008.
The comparison to other recovering cities is damning. Manhattan’s office market is, in the words of the Wall Street Journal, “roaring back.” San Francisco — battered, ridiculed, written off — is being rescued by the booming artificial intelligence industry. Denver has neither of those forces. No sector requiring physical co-location. No hot new industry generating fresh demand. Just 12 million square feet of emptiness, and a set of causes that are fully traceable to specific decisions made by specific people.
THE CAUSES: A CASCADE, NOT A COINCIDENCE
The First Wave: Remote Work Destroyed the Demand Floor
The obvious cause is the one everyone reaches for first, and it’s real — but it doesn’t explain why Denver is the worst among 50 major American cities. It explains why Denver has a problem. The other causes explain why Denver’s problem is bigger than everyone else’s.
Remote and hybrid work restructured the economics of office space nationwide. Denver’s white-collar professional services and technology workforce — precisely the population most capable of sustained remote work — adapted to it, and then stayed. Many employers adopted permanent hybrid policies, reducing their space requirements by 30 to 50 percent when leases expired. A company that once needed 50,000 square feet for a five-day-a-week workforce discovered it needed 25,000 to 35,000 square feet for a three-day-a-week workforce.
As of 2025, downtown Denver’s return-to-office rate was 64%. That sounds like progress until you register what it means: on any given weekday, more than one in three people who once filled those towers isn’t there. The foot traffic, the lunch crowds, the retail spending, the parking revenue, the incidental commerce that a functioning downtown generates — all of it scaled back by a third or more, permanently.
The Second Wave: Oil and Gas Didn’t Just Leave — It Was Shown the Door
Here is where Denver’s story diverges from every other city’s story. Here is where a national problem becomes a Colorado-specific disaster.
In 2015, oil and gas companies represented 35% of downtown Denver’s occupied office space. Today that figure is 7%. Twenty-eight percentage points of the city’s dominant tenant category, gone. That is not a market fluctuation. That is the near-total extinction of what was once downtown’s anchor industry — and it did not happen entirely by accident.
“It’s more about companies feeling like the state really wants them here.” — CBRE Senior Vice President, Colorado Sun
In 2019, a newly elected Democratic governor named Jared Polis signed Senate Bill 181 into law. Passed in under 60 days by a Democratic supermajority legislature, SB 181 fundamentally rewrote Colorado’s oil and gas regulatory framework. The bill explicitly prioritized environmental restriction over development certainty, made the permitting process significantly more rigorous, gave local land-use authorities new power to approve or deny drilling permits, and restructured the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. At the moment of SB 181’s passage, oil and gas companies leased approximately 4.5 million square feet of downtown Denver office space.
The CBRE executive who watches these markets daily summarized it with remarkable candor in a Colorado Sun interview: “It’s more about companies feeling like the state really wants them here.” That is not a real estate observation. That is a verdict on a political climate.
The Third Wave: The Tech Cavalry Retreated
Denver had a genuine economic diversification success story in the late 2010s. Bay Area technology companies, priced out of San Francisco and attracted by Denver’s quality of life and mountain access, established significant Denver offices. The narrative was compelling: the boom-bust oil economy was being replaced by a stable knowledge economy anchored by technology.
The pandemic demolished that narrative. When remote work became viable everywhere simultaneously, the logic of paying Denver commercial real estate rates for a workforce that could work from their homes in Highlands Ranch evaporated.
Then came the departure that crystallized the technology story. In February 2026, Palantir Technologies — a data analytics and AI company with a market capitalization of approximately $328 billion, headquartered in Denver — announced it would move its corporate headquarters to Miami. The departure came amid widespread speculation about Colorado’s sweeping AI regulations, Senate Bill 24-205, which made Colorado the first state to impose pre-emptive, comprehensive AI compliance requirements on companies operating within its borders. A Democratic legislature passed it. A Democratic governor signed it.
The Colorado Chamber of Commerce has maintained a formal corporate departure tracker since 2019 — the year Democrats achieved their current trifecta control. The tracker documented 98 companies that relocated or moved business operations to other states between 2019 and 2025, resulting in the loss of more than 13,600 jobs. Twenty-seven of those departures occurred in 2025 alone — accelerating, not slowing. Colorado experienced a net loss of 34 public company headquarters since 2022.
The Fourth Accelerant: Overbuilding Into a Collapsing Market
The final structural cause is almost comically bad timing. More than one million square feet of new Class A office space was added to the downtown Denver market after 2022 — after the vacancy crisis was already fully visible. New supply entered a market experiencing the steepest demand destruction in its modern history.
The predictable result: tenants who remained in the market migrated to the shiny new buildings, abandoning their older Class B and C towers. Those abandoned buildings now carry a vacancy rate approaching 50%, with some individual structures entirely empty. The real estate professor at Metropolitan State University of Denver who has watched this market for decades put it plainly: the lower-quality buildings in lesser locations will “die on the vine.” Some of these structures will never be office buildings again.
THE CONSEQUENCES: THE DOOM LOOP ACTIVATES
A Billion Dollars Gone, and Counting
The most immediate and quantifiable consequence of 39% office vacancy is the obliteration of commercial real estate values — and the billions of dollars that investors, lenders, and pension funds have already lost.
The “Cash Register Building” — the Wells Fargo Center, Denver’s iconic 52-story downtown tower — was recently reappraised at $115 million. Its 2019 valuation: approximately $450 million. That is a 76% decline in value in roughly five years. Denver ranks sixth in the nation for CMBS office delinquencies, with a 27.2% delinquency rate nearly triple the national average.
City Center sold in 2025 for $57.4 million. The purchase price in January 2020 was $400 million. That $342.6 million seemingly evaporated.
City Center — two buildings at 17th and California streets — sold in late 2025 for $57.4 million. The purchase price in January 2020 was $400 million. Brookfield Properties put $170 million in equity in — that went to zero. Wells Fargo provided a $230 million loan and recouped a fraction of it. Los Angeles-based Gemini Rosemont and its lender JPMorgan Chase lost $170 million at Denver Energy Center, which sold for $5.25 million. LBA Realty and its lender lost $152 million on Denver Place, trading at a 75% discount.
The documented losses from completed transactions now exceed one billion dollars. Multiple additional towers sit in receivership. Those losses, when realized, will add substantially to the total.
The City Budget: Spending Up, Revenue Collapsing
Denver faced a $250 million budget hole requiring major cuts, furloughs, and freezes. A Common Sense Institute analysis found that downtown Denver would have generated $646 million more in taxable sales in just the first half of 2024 if it were recovering at the rate of comparable Colorado counties. That gap represents the lunch crowds, the parking fees, the retail sales tax generated by 50,000 daily commuters who no longer show up.
The property tax situation contains a time-delayed detonation. Current valuations are based on market conditions from 2022 to mid-2024. Most of the catastrophic building sales — showing 75 to 80% discounts — occurred after that period. The next reassessment cycle will capture those losses in full, and the implications will cascade through city, county, and school district budgets. In Minneapolis — a comparable market — residential property owners now pay 55.6% of property taxes, up from 47.4% in 2020, as commercial properties shed assessed value. Denver is heading toward the same rebalancing.
Crime, Homelessness, and the Displacement Trap
The connection between office vacancy and street-level disorder is not speculative. It is mechanical, and it runs in both directions simultaneously.
The mechanism is what the urbanist Jane Jacobs identified 60 years ago as “eyes on the street” — the natural safety produced by active sidewalks, working populations, and functional commerce. When buildings empty and workers stop commuting, the eyes disappear. Empty lobbies, vacant storefronts, and deserted sidewalks create physical environments where open-air drug use and encampments flourish. That drives away more workers, which empties more buildings, which removes more eyes from the street.
The data confirms this loop with geographic precision. Downtown Denver’s crime rate rose 44% since 2019, even as total homelessness grew 86% over the same period. More revealing: Denver Police Department’s District 6 — covering downtown and north Capitol Hill — was the only police district in the entire city to see an uptick in violent crime from 2024 to 2025. Everywhere else in Denver, crime was declining. In the vacant downtown core, it was still rising.
Mayor Johnston’s “Solution” That Isn’t
Johnston has claimed what he calls the largest reduction in street homelessness in the history of any major American city — most recently asserting a 64% decline in unsheltered individuals since 2023.
But the methodology is fatally compromised. The 2026 Point-in-Time count was conducted on January 26th — in sub-freezing temperatures — on a night when emergency cold-weather shelters were activated. People who would normally have been sleeping outside were inside because it was 20 degrees. The mayor is counting a weather event as a policy victory.
More fundamentally, the reduction in street homelessness did not produce a reduction in total homelessness. The Colorado State of Homelessness Report — tracking data across an entire year — found total homelessness in the metro area actually increased. The Common Sense Institute found the number of homeless individuals in the City of Denver rose 86% since 2019 and 12% just since 2024. The city moved people from sidewalks to shelter beds — not from homelessness to housing.
The city also changed its public tracking dashboard in April 2025, eliminating metrics for how many people died, went to jail, or returned to the streets. Denver’s own independently-elected city auditor found approximately $20 million in underreported program expenses out of a total spend approaching $180 million. The program’s name and structure changed “roughly 15 times” according to a city Housing Stability official.
When you need fifteen names for one program, you don’t have a program. You have a press release with a budget.
The encampment clearance strategy — the operational core of Johnston’s approach — is, by the testimony of his own city council members, a displacement operation. Council Member Kevin Flynn reported in 2024 that Johnston’s initiative had moved downtown homelessness into his south Denver district. Council Member Jamie Torres reported that homelessness was migrating along the light rail lines into her west Denver district. A peer-reviewed study in the Journal of Urban Health confirmed the pattern: clearing encampments redistributes disorder rather than eliminating it.
The Retail Collapse: 16th Street as Exhibit A
The retail vacancy rate on 16th Street — Denver’s most iconic pedestrian corridor, which just completed a massively expensive multi-year renovation — is 25%. Metro Denver’s overall retail vacancy rate is 4%. The city’s flagship street is one quarter empty.
Building owners who paid peak prices for properties now worth a fraction of that cannot afford to lower rents to market-clearing levels without admitting their assets have collapsed. Many are in receivership. So empty storefronts stay empty.
Cherry Creek, meanwhile, has a retail vacancy rate of 0.5%. The same city, the same economy. One geography is thriving and one is 25% vacant. The difference is not the renovation. It is the workers.
THE POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE: ONE PARTY, TOTAL CONTROL, FULL OWNERSHIP
The Record of Control
Colorado is not a state with contested political power. Colorado has a Democratic trifecta and a Democratic triplex: the Democratic Party controls the governor’s office, the secretary of state, the attorney general, and both chambers of the state legislature. Democrats have held continuous control of the state House since 2013. The trifecta has been unbroken since 2019. In 2022, Democrats expanded their House majority to 46-19 — approaching two-to-one. By 2024, they held a 23-12 majority in the Senate.
At the city level, Denver has had Democratic mayors continuously since at least 2003. The Denver City Council ranges from mainstream liberal to democratic socialist. The ideological distance between its most conservative and most progressive members is measured in degrees of left.
The Direct Legislative Lines
SB 181, signed by Governor Polis in April 2019, rewrote Colorado’s oil and gas regulatory framework in ways that sent an unmistakable signal of hostility to an industry that occupied 4.5 million square feet of downtown Denver office space. The subsequent collapse of oil and gas’s downtown presence — from 35% of occupied space to 7% — unfolded over the following years.
SB 24-205, the AI Act, signed by Governor Polis in 2024, made Colorado the first state to impose comprehensive pre-emptive AI compliance requirements. Within two years, Palantir — a $328 billion AI-dependent company headquartered in Denver — announced its departure for Miami.
The Chamber of Commerce’s corporate departure tracker began in 2019, the year of the Democratic trifecta’s formation, and has documented an accelerating pattern of departures. Colorado ranked 48th out of 50 states for new business starts in 2024. It lost a net of 3,934 business establishments that year alone.
The Counterarguments, Honestly Addressed
The strongest counterargument is real and must be acknowledged: remote work is a national phenomenon that hit every major downtown regardless of political control. This is true. It is also insufficient as an explanation for Denver’s singular position at the top of the vacancy rankings.
Every major city is dealing with the remote work floor. Denver is the worst. The differential is explained by the Colorado-specific factors: the regulatory exile of oil and gas, the departure of technology companies accelerated by hostile AI legislation, the sustained accumulation of regulatory and cost burdens that drove 98 companies and 13,600 jobs to other states. Those are policy outcomes, produced by identifiable legislation, signed by identifiable officials, passed by a legislature with an identifiable partisan composition.
The second counterargument — that some of this predates Democratic control — is also partially true. The 1980s oil bust created Colorado’s first major downtown vacancy crisis. COVID was not a policy choice. But the response to COVID, the response to the homelessness surge, the regulatory decisions that accelerated corporate departure — those happened on a Democratic trifecta’s watch, across seven years of uninterrupted, unchecked power.
My Verdict
When one party holds the governorship, both legislative chambers by overwhelming margins, every statewide office, the city hall, and the city council — for seven to thirteen years without meaningful opposition — they own the outcomes. There is no aisle to point across. There is no minority party to blame. The legislation bears their names. The signatures are theirs.
Colorado ranked 48th out of 50 states for new business starts in 2024. The people who wrote this story are still in office.
Under that uncontested control: Colorado lost 98 companies and 13,600 jobs between 2019 and 2025. Oil and gas shrank from 35% of downtown Denver’s occupied office space to 7%. Downtown office vacancy climbed from 16.5% to 38.9% — highest in the country. Homelessness grew 86% since 2019. The city is running a $250 million budget deficit. Over a billion dollars in commercial real estate value has been incinerated.
None of this happened to Colorado. It was produced in Colorado, by the people Coloradans elected, exercising the power Coloradans gave them.
THE DOOM LOOP: HOW IT ALL CONNECTS
Pull back and look at what has been built here, because the individual threads weave into something larger than any one of them.
Remote work struck the first blow, reducing demand across the entire national office market. That was the floor — the damage every city absorbed. Denver then absorbed additional blows specific to its own policy choices: oil and gas driven out by SB 181, technology companies chilled by AI regulation and the broader anti-business climate, 98 companies and 13,600 jobs departed for states with more predictable governance.
The resulting vacancy — 12 million empty square feet — deactivated the human ecosystem of downtown. No workers means no lunch crowd. No lunch crowd means closed restaurants. Closed restaurants and empty storefronts mean no eyes on the street. No eyes on the street means the physical environment becomes hospitable to the disorder that further deters workers from returning.
The homelessness surge — up 86% since 2019, driven by housing costs the city never meaningfully addressed — filled the deactivated spaces. The city’s response, nearly $180 million of encampment clearances and shelter beds, moved the visible population from swept blocks to surrounding neighborhoods, expanding the zone of perceived danger rather than contracting it.
Companies evaluating their real estate decisions look at the full geography. They look at District 6 crime statistics showing the only rising violent crime rate in the city. They look at 16th Street with its 25% retail vacancy. And they make the rational decision to go somewhere else — Cherry Creek, the Tech Center, the suburbs, Texas, Florida, Miami.
Which empties more space. Which deactivates more streetscape. Which deepens the disorder. Which drives out more companies.
That is the doom loop. That is what a single line in the Wall Street Journal opened up.
The building that sold for $5.25 million after trading for multiples of that number, the workers who don’t commute downtown anymore, the restaurants that closed on 16th Street, the homeless man swept from one block to a neighboring one, the oil company that moved its Denver office to Houston, the AI company that moved its headquarters to Miami, the city auditor who found $20 million in unaccounted spending, the 48th-place ranking for new business starts, the $250 million budget hole — these are not separate problems with separate causes.
They are one story.
And the people who wrote it are still in office.


Well done article.
Super article telling it like it is. Thank you.