Before you get to the article, here’s what prompted my research the past several days. First, I learned the Colorado legislature (the “politburo” as I like to call it) had finally completed a state budget. The legislators were facing a $1.5 billion budget shortfall, yet somehow they managed to pass a budget that was larger than last year’s budget! That’s some kind of stupid to be in the hole, and still come out the other end spending more.
Second, somewhere in the world of the Internet I ran across a snippet that claimed the federal government workforce was the smallest since the days of President Lyndon Johnson! How could that be? Have we really reduced the federal workforce by that much? Turns out, yes, we have.
Finally, putting those two little facts together, I couldn’t help but wonder, how is that we don’t recognize that an ever-expanding Colorado state government has made us poorer with fewer jobs, a declining economy; and yet,
the feds have reduced the number of federal jobs, but the deficit still remains high. What do those two facts mean for overall economic growth? My thesis is simple: more government generally means less growth. See for yourself.
The thesis is simple, and deeply counter to the way Democrats in Colorado and Washington talk about government: the bigger the public sector grows relative to the private economy, the more it weighs down growth in the private sector. Democrat Governor Jared Polis’s Colorado gives us a live example—ever‑rising spending and a growing government workforce alongside a state economy that has slipped into the doldrums. At the federal level, the pattern is similar: an ever‑expanding fiscal state correlates with a weaker growth trajectory. The bet here is that if Washington paired a smaller federal government workforce with real restraint on federal spending, the result would be faster private‑sector growth than we see today.
Colorado’s political class (and Democrats everywhere) is very good at talking about cuts. They are not good at actually cutting anything that matters. During Jared Polis’s tenure, Colorado’s state budget has grown almost every year, setting new nominal records even in supposedly “lean” times. In 2025, the headlines out of Denver said lawmakers had to slash more than a billion dollars from the governor’s proposed budget to close a projected shortfall. Yet the bill Polis signed that spring still totaled around 44 billion dollars in spending—larger than the budget just a few years earlier and part of a broader upward trend. By May 2026, Governor Polis was signing a roughly $46.8–47 billion budget, another multi‑billion dollar increase in just one year and far above the spending level at the beginning of his tenure. Analysts who track Colorado’s finances note that, over the past two decades, government spending per resident has climbed by roughly 31%, outpacing both inflation and population growth. In other words, when Colorado Democrats say, “we cut the budget,” they almost always mean they cut their wish list, not the actual size of state government.
The job market tells us the same story. 2025 was a bad year in Colorado’s private economy. A breakdown of Bureau of Labor Statistics data shows Colorado’s private sector lost about 10,100 jobs over the year, a decline of roughly 0.4%, with thirteen of twenty major sectors shedding workers. Government, however, added about 2,400 jobs, growing its payroll by about 0.5% even as private employers were shrinking. Over another recent twelve‑month stretch, government jobs increased by about 12,000 while private jobs rose by roughly 10,200—meaning the public workforce grew faster than the private workforce. Colorado’s Common Sense Institute has pointed out that in some months nearly all net job growth in Colorado comes from government hiring. For example, in December 2025 the state added about 1,200 jobs, of which 900 were in government and only 300 in the private sector. In a year when businesses tightened their belts, the one reliable growth industry in Polis‑era Colorado was government itself.
Contrast that with what has happened in Washington during Trump’s return to the White House. Fiscally, Trump’s record is clearly not that of a small‑government purist. Independent budget watchdogs estimate that his previous term in office added around $8.4 trillion to ten‑year debt projections, largely through tax cuts, new spending, and emergency COVID measures. The federal government is still running massive deficits—around $1.8 trillion last fiscal year—even in a growing economy. On the numbers, Republicans in Washington have been perfectly willing to write big checks and leave the bill for later.
But if we shift from dollars to people, the Trump‑era federal government has actually become smaller. Recent data put federal government employment—civilian workers including postal employees—at roughly 2.66–2.68 million, the lowest level since about 1966. Since late 2024, the federal workforce has shrunk by roughly 350,000 jobs, a drop of around 12%. Federal workers now make up only about 1.7% of total U.S. employment, down from over 4% in the 1960s. This reduction has come from a mix of hiring freezes, aggressive attrition, early retirements and buyouts, and targeted program cuts overseen by Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), combined with repeated shutdown threats and budget fights that discouraged new entrants into federal service. While Congress continued to authorize large spending, the permanent bureaucracy—what people often call “the federal workforce” (and many of us refer to as the administrative state)—is smaller than it has been in six decades.
Now we have a useful contrast. In Denver, a Democratic governor and legislature have treated the state workforce as a protected class: when money gets tight, they may trim programs and slow the growth of some agencies, but the overall budget keeps rising and public employment is insulated from the pain private employers feel. In Washington, a Republican president has presided over the mirror image: a federal government that continues to spend and borrow heavily, but with a civilian workforce that has been pushed back to Johnson‑era levels. Colorado Democrats have grown the share of Coloradans who work for the state; Trump’s Washington has reduced the share of Americans who work for the federal government—even if it has not yet reduced what that government spends.
The question is whether any of this matters for growth, beyond our ideological preferences about the proper role of the state. Here the empirical literature lines up more with my thesis than with the standard progressive story. A large body of work finds that as government grows beyond a certain point, each additional dollar of public spending yields less benefit and increasingly crowds out private activity. Reviews of dozens of studies conclude that the relationship between government size and growth is hump‑shaped: moving from a very small state toward a moderate one can support growth, but pushing beyond that “optimal” size tends to slow it. Several papers that try to pin down the optimal size of government for advanced economies often cluster around public spending in roughly the 25–35% of GDP range; beyond that, higher spending is usually associated with slower long‑term growth.
The Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) has put it bluntly. In an analysis of member countries, OECD economists find that larger governments are associated with lower long‑term growth and that bigger states also slow countries’ ability to catch up to the productivity frontier. They also find that not all public spending is equal: investment in infrastructure and education tends to support potential growth, while pensions and subsidies have a significantly negative effect. A Cato‑summarized version of this work emphasizes the same point: within a given tax burden, shifting money away from transfers and subsidies and toward productive investment can help, but once government overall gets too large, even “better‑mix” spending cannot fully offset the drag.
Other studies quantify the effect. A widely cited review from a free‑market perspective concludes that a one‑percentage‑point increase in government size as a share of GDP is associated, on average, with a reduction in the long‑run growth rate on the order of a tenth of a percentage point or more—small in any one year, but enormous when compounded over decades. A recent cross‑country analysis finds that in high‑spending nations, increases in government expenditure are negatively related to growth, suggesting diminishing returns and misallocation of resources as the public sector expands. Surveys of the public‑debt literature reach a similar conclusion: when large, persistent deficits push debt levels ever higher, long‑run growth tends to suffer through lower investment and productivity, especially once debt rises above already‑high baselines.
Taken together, this evidence does not say “any dollar of government spending is bad.” It says something more nuanced—and more damaging to the Colorado/Washington status quo. Moderate levels of government spending on core public goods can support growth; but as spending rises and the state does more redistribution and consumption on autopilot, the costs—higher taxes, more borrowing, more regulation, more political allocation of resources—begin to outweigh the benefits. That is exactly the trajectory Colorado is on: state spending per capita rising faster than inflation, more of the workforce employed by, or dependent on, government, and yet a private economy that is slowing, losing jobs in key years while the public sector continues to hire.
Economically, that is also why the Trump story in Washington is incomplete. Shrinking the federal workforce to its lowest share of total employment since the 1960s is consistent with higher growth: it reduces the direct footprint of government in the labor market and may even improve efficiency in some agencies. But if Congress continues to run $1.8 trillion deficits and to ratchet up total federal spending, the growth drag from a too‑large fiscal state remains. The literature is clear: tax cuts financed by more borrowing are not pro‑growth in the long run; tax relief paired with real reductions in low‑value or distortionary spending is.
That leads back to the thesis. Colorado is a case study in Democratic governance under balanced‑budget rules: because the state cannot borrow freely, Democrats have chosen to balance the books by steadily increasing nominal spending, protecting and expanding government jobs, and leaning on taxpayers and a strong national economy to cover the difference. Washington under Trump is a case study in Republican governance with no such constraint: federal headcount has been cut back to Great Society‑era levels, but the checks being written are larger than ever, and the deficits that fund them are a clear headwind for future growth. If the research is right, the formula for stronger long‑run growth is not complicated: keep genuinely productive public investment, dramatically scale back consumption‑type spending and transfers, and then cut taxes to reflect a smaller, cheaper state. What Colorado shows is what happens when you move in the opposite direction. What Washington shows is what happens when you do only half the job.


All democrats are off their rocker along with some rinos give um hell Michael 🤠
I’m getting into the diaper business. NY to follow Cali.